Abstract. It is known that a quantum bit commitment that would be secure against all attacks allowed by quantum mechanics is impossible if a standard model of communication is used. This result was a severe step back for quantum cryptography. However, this impossibility result applies only if no bit commitment exists initially between Alice and Bob. Here we consider an initial situation in which the committer, Alice, is already commited to m 2 bits in an information theoretic sense. These information theoretic bit commitments might have been obtained using a trusted noisy channel for example. We prove that Alice can obtain M > m 2 independent bit commitments using m 2 initial information theoretic bit commitments. We also discuss related proposals, in particular, we analyse the quantum bit escrow of Ta-Shma, Vazirani and Yao, the cheat-sensitive bit commitment of Hardy and Kent, and the relativistic bit commitment of Kent.
Introduction
In a concrete example of bit commitment, a party, Alice, writes a bit x on a piece of paper and puts it into a safe. She gives the safe to another party, Bob, but keeps the key. When the box is on Bob's side both Alice and Bob cannot access its content. The objective of this scheme, and of bit commitment in general, is that Alice cannot change her mind about the value of the bit b, but meanwhile Bob cannot determine the bit x. At a later time, if Alice wants to unveil x to Bob, she gives the key to Bob. In quantum bit commitment, we try to realise bit commitment using only exchange of quantum or classical information. Physical devices such as safe boxes which contain and yet hide information is not allowed in such a model of communication. Furthermore, the standard model of communication allows the participants to send their message one after the other at their convenience. Of course a participant might have to wait until after he received some expected messages before sending his message, but the exact time of the transmission should be irrelevant.
The discovery in this model (and even in less practical models) that no bit commitment protocol can be secure against all attack allowed by quantum mechanics was a severe step back for quantum cryptography [1, 2] . Recently, as an attempt to improve the situation, unconditionally secure protocols for tasks that are related to bit commitment were proposed [5, 6, 7] . However, more work is required to see if the tasks that are realised by these protocols can be useful in quantum cryptography [8] . We will discuss these new proposals in sections 2 and 6.
The idea of quantum bit commitment expansion was partially inspired by quantum key distribution [9, 10] . The security of quantum key distribution against all attacks was known in 1996 [11] . Quantum key distribution requires authentication, and the only known way to realise authentication against all attack alllowed by quantum mechanics is to start the protocol with a small secret key [12] . Therefore, if an authentication protocol is used, what we call quantum key distribution is actually quantum key expansion. Here we show that a quantum protocol for quantum bit commitment expansion is possible. The proposed protocol is secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of physics. The commitments generated by the protocols are independent and respect the standard definition of bit commitment.
Our bit commitment expansion protocol is not ruled out by the known impossibility result [2] because we assume that the committer, Alice, is initially commited to m 2 bits x[i, j], i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, in an information theoretic sense. The protocol generates M > m 2 independent bit commitments.
The protocol is useful because to be started it only requires that the participants meet once and use some hardware which is mutually checked to generate the m 2 initial commitments. Thereafter, Alice and Bob can use the bit commitments generated by the protocol to generate new ones at a distance. Furthermore, our protocol can most likely expand m 2 computationally secure bit commitments into M > m 2 computationally secure bit commitments. If we use such an expansion in a computational setting, we will know that we only need to trust the initial m 2 computationally secure bit commitments. This might be interesting in a quantum computational setting if we further assume that quantum information cannot be stored for a long time. We call this extra assumption the decoherence assumption.
In section 2 we analyse the binding and concealing conditions for bit commitment. In sections 3 and 4 we describe the protocol and prove its security. In section 5, we discuss why the general attack against bit commitment does not apply to our expansion protocol. Finally, in section 6, ignoring the decoherence assumption, we briefly expain why temporary computational assumptions for the m 2 initial bit commitments cannot be used to generate information theoretic bit commitments.
The concealing and binding properties
Both the binding and the concealing properties of bit commitment needs to be reconsidered when we are in the quantum world. It is known [2] that, if we consider all attacks allowed by quantum mechanics, there is a trade off between these two properties. It is hard to analyse them separately, but because we must start somewhere let us start by the concealing property.
The concealing property
Usually for the concealing property it is simply required that Bob cannot obtain any information about the bit after the commit phase. We will also adopt this simple concealing property. However, there is one alternative to this concealing property which we would like to analyse. One might think that it could be useful to design a protocol in which, as soon as it is known that the bit x will not be open, Alice executes a test to check that Bob doesn't keep information about the bit x. If Bob tries to extract and keep the information he will disturb the state and he will be detected. The idea is that it does not matter if the bit that is committed by Alice is temporarily stored on Bob's side if Bob cannot keep the information and pass the test at the same time. Recently, Hardy and Kent [6] and independently Ta-Shma, Vazirani and Yao [7] proposed such a principle and asked whether or not it could be useful in quantum cryptography. Here we address this question via an analysis of Crépeau's protocol [13, 14] for one-out-of-two string oblivious distribution.
In one-out-of-two string oblivious distribution, Bob receives two uniformly distributed strings w 0 , w 1 and Alice can choose one of these two strings, that is, she receives w x for some x ∈ {0, 1} of her choice. Alice receives no information at all about wx and Bob learns nothing about x. One-out-of-two string oblivious distribution can be seen as a bit commitment. To commit x Alice simply choose to receive w x . To open x Alice announces x and w x . Because she doesn't know wx she cannot openx, that is, she is committed to x.
We describe a variation on Crépeau's protocol. In this variation Alice can obtain some information about wx, but not the entire string. This will be enough for our purpose. Let |θ be the state of a photon polarised at angle θ. The BB84 encoding maps a pair (h, b) ∈ {0, 1} 2 into the state |h×(−1) b π/2+b×π/4 . The bit b ∈ {0, 1} is called a "basis" because it identifies the BB84 basis [9] in which the state belongs. The bit b = 0 identifies the rectilinear basis {|0 , |π/2 } and the bit b = 1 identifies diagonal basis {|π/4 , | − π/4 }. The bit h is said to be encoded in the basis b.
Crépeau's protocol.
Step 1. Alice picks a string of n bases a ∈ {0, 1} n and commits a[k] for every k = 1, . . . , n. These bases will be used later.
Step 2. Bob uniformly picks at random a string of bits h ∈ {0, 1} n , a string of BB84 bases b ∈ {0, 1} n , respectively encodes the bits h[k] using the bases b[k] and sends the n photons to Bob.
Step 3. Alice measures in the basis a[k] and she notes and commits the outcome g[k] for k = 1, . . . , n.
Step 4. Bob picks a set R ⊆ {1, . . . , n} uniformaly at random, and ask Alice to open the bits in R. Let S = {1, . . . , n} − R. The open positions k ∈ R are used to test that Alice did measure all the photons at step 3 whereas the non open position k ∈ S will be used in the remainder of the protocol.
Step 5. Bob announces the bases b[k] for k ∈ S and Alice can separate S in two sets
The size of the two sets Z 0 and Z 1 must be sufficiently large otherwise Bob aborts the protocol. The two strings on Bob's side are
The security of Crépeau's protocol against Alice was proven by Yao [15] under the hypothesis that Alice could not defeat the binding property of the 2n commitments. To commit to x Alice simply chooses to receive w x . To open x Alice announces x and w x . Because Alice does not know wx entirely she can only open x. We will call the bit commitments used inside Crépeau's protocol the internal bit commitments in order to distinguish them from the host bit commitment protocol.
Crépeau's protocol seen as the commit phase of a bit commitment will be useful in our analysis of the binding property. In the protocol Alice commits n bits g[i], i = 1, . . . , n, and only the positions in a random subset R ⊆ {1, . . . , n} are open in order to test Alice. The non tested positions i ∈ S = {1, . . . , n} − R are used in the remainder of the protocol. We will see that the binding property is important even for the bits g[i] that will never be open! The binding property must then be defined in terms of a fictive situation where Alice decides to open such a bit. In this fictive situation, the information that is returned by Bob would help her to control the value of the bit. We will see why this returned information, despite the fact that it concerns a fictive situation, cannot be ignored.
We will apply the attack against bit commitment [2] to Crépeau's protocol seen as the commit phase of a bit commitment. Note that if the standard model of communication is used, it is always possible to replace a protocol by another one which is entirely executed at the quantum level and is not less secure. However, if the model of communication is non standard, for example if it uses safe boxes to hide information, a quantum version might not even exist. The use of safe boxes will be considered later. Here we consider the standard model of communication. First, we modify the protocol so that the transmission of every classical bit is replaced by the transmission of a qbit. In the attack the cheater needs only to execute the honest algorithm at the quantum level during the commit phase. We want to analyse the effect of the attack on the security of the internal bit commitments. We must consider the situation which is obtained after that Bob returned information to Alice in the internal commitments (to pass some tests). Let us consider an internal bit commitment to the outcome g[k] at some position k ∈ R. Note that g[k] is the outcome of a measurement which is kept at the quantum level. After that Alice has committed the outcome g[k] = 0, the photon sent by Bob together with the system used for this commitment is left in a state |0 ⊗ Ψ 0 where the ket to the left is the state of the photon that was sent by Bob. The corresponding state for g[k] = 1 is |1 ⊗ Ψ 1 . If initially the photon measured is in the state α|0 + β|1 , after the commitment we have the state α(|0 ⊗ Ψ 0 ) + β(|1 ⊗ Ψ 1 ). The impossibility theorem for bit commitment says that, if after Bob has returned the information to pass the test, Bob has no information about g[k], then Alice can pass from Ψ 0 to Ψ 1 and so she can undo the measurement. The important conclusion is not that Crépeau's protocol is defeated because the internal commitments are not secure. We knew this fact. The important conclusion is that, because we must consider the binding property when the bit is not open, the trade off between the amount of information on Bob's side and the binding property on Alice's side is exactly the same as when Bob is not tested by Alice. The exact same theorem applies in the same way whether Bob must return or not some information to Alice in order to pass a test! We conclude from this example that, for one of the most, if not the most important function of bit commitment in quantum cryptography, it is useless to ask Bob to return information to Alice when the bit is not open.
The binding property
Another point that comes up here is that, in order to be useful, the binding property must express the fact that the committed bit is like the outcome of an irreversible measurement. We recall that we have reduced the problem to a protocol entirely executed at the quantum level. Therefore, if the outcome of a measurement that is executed by Alice is not found outside Alice's location, then the measurement is not really executed.
Our strategy to formulate a binding property for the quantum world is to make an analogy with the binding property in the classical world. We will focus on the information theoretic formulation. We will describe the standard classical binding property. It may not appear so, but that is only because usuallly one does not bother to mention what is going on with the random tapes. To generalise to the quantum world, we must look carefully at the random tapes. First, note that if Alice cheats, she doesn't have to pick a value for the committed bit x. The binding property states that, even though Alice might not pick any bit x, she might not even pick a random bit x, Alice must be committed to a bitx ∈ {0, 1}. We will denote C * and O * Alice's strategy during the commit and the opening phases respectively. The bitx must be a deterministic function of Alice's strategy in the commit phase C * , Alice's random tape r A and Bob's random tape r B , that is,x = F(C * , r A , r B ), for some deterministic function F. It is clear thatx can depend on Alice's random tape r A . It can also depend on Bob's random tape r B because Alice's view might depend on r B . Let x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} be the bit that is accepted in the opening phase. The bit x takes the value ⊥ when the bit is not accepted by Bob. The bitx must have the property that, for every strategy O * during the open phase in which Alice has access tox, the probability that x =x ⊕ 1 is negligeable.
Note that it was not neccessary in this binding condition to require thatx is a deterministic function of (C * , r A , r B ). It would have been as secure to allow F to be a non deterministic function of (C * , r A , r B ) becausex cannot respect the condition x =x with probability almost 1 ifx depends upon a random tape which is not used in the computation of x in the protocol. So the randomness in the constructed bitx could only depend upon the random tapes r A and r B anyway. This redundant and unneccessary requirement will not have its counterpart in the quantum formulation. Also, the fact that we givex to Alice in the opening phase does not make the condition stronger (as a constraint on the protocol). Alice could guess the value ofx and succeed with probability 1/2 anyway. It certainly does not make the definition weaker. There was no fundamental need to givex to Alice in the definition. We only givex to Alice because it will help us later to obtain a corresponding quantum formulation.
The difficulty in the definition of the binding condition in the quantum world is the fact that quantum mechanics is intrinsically random. Even if we consider fixed value for the random tapes, the attack might still generate random values. Before we propose our definition, we would like to discuss an alternative approach proposed by Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [16] . Here we only consider the information theoretic version of their property. For a given attack by Alice in the commit phase, we define p x the probability that x is accepted by Bob given that Alice uses the optimal strategy to have x accepted in the opening phase. The binding condition proposed by Dumais and al. is p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + ǫ where ǫ goes to 0 as a security parameter increases. The idea behind this definition is to make no reference to the random tapes. In particular, Alice could easily obtain p 0 = p 1 = 1/2 simply by picking the bit x at random in the honest protocol. The natural question is whether or not this definition, when used in the classical world, is equivalent to the standard classical definition. Unfortunately, we don't know the answer. The next natural question is whether or not this definition is satisfactory. We don't know the answer for the classical world. We certainly don't know the answer for the quantum world.
As we explained previously, a satisfactory bindind condition should at the least be sufficient to guarantee that a measurement was executed. We don't know if the condition p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + ǫ is sufficient. However, even if the condition p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + ǫ was sufficient, it seems useful to have an alternative formulation for the binding property. Now, we explain our binding property. The binding propery that we obtain is very close to what was proposed in [2] , but here we are more precise. First note that every attack C * during the commit phase determines a unique state Ψ at the end of the commit phase. Any random tape used in the commit phase will appear as superposition in Ψ. The function F in the classical formulation will be replaced by an orthogonal measurement Fx on Ψ with the following properties: 1) every POVM O * x on Ψ defined by Alice's strategy during the opening phase is equivalent to the orthogonal measurement Fx followed by a refinement O *
x,x and 2) for every refinement O * x,x the probability that x =x and x =⊥ is negligeable. One interesting point about this definition is that it is most likely equivalent to the classical binding property in the classical world, but we have not checked the details. However, the most important is that we can show that it implies that there exists a quantum system outside Alice's location which store the bitx.
Proof. The orthogonal measurement Fx on Ψ defines two states Ψ 0 = F 0 Ψ and Ψ 1 = F 1 Ψ. The state Ψx almost always leads either to x =x or x =⊥, no matter what is Alice's strategy during the opening. So Alice cannot pass from the state Ψ 0 to the state Ψ 1 using a unitary transformation on her side. The theorem against bit commitment implies that the information aboutx ∈ {0, 1} can be obtained outside Alice's location. This concludes the proof.
More about testing Bob
We explained that it was not so useful to test Bob in a quantum bit commitment protocol if the objective is to use the commitment in the quantum world. However, one might think that it can be useful if we only want to use this quantum commitment in the classical world thereafter. We now explain the limitation of this approach. Let us assume that Alice cannot cheat after the commit phase even if she executes the protocol at the quantum level. This implies that the two density matrices on Bob's side do not overlap or overlap only very little. This further implies that Bob can in principle obtain information about the bits without disturbing these density matrices. So even if a test is executed to detect Bob, Bob will pass the test with high probability. Therefore, any task which is realised by this approach is neccessarily a weak variation on bit commitment. In particular, this is the case for cheat sensitive bit commitment [6] and bit escrow [7] .
Single Opening Bitwise Accessible String Commitment
The main construction in our approach is a new primitive which we call a Single Opening Bitwise Accessible String Commitment (SOBASC) from Alice to Bob. Let Ω ∈ {0, 1} N be a string of bits known by Alice. The SOBASC has two phases: the SOBAS-Commit phase and the SOBAS-Open phase. In the SOBAS-Commit phase, Alice makes a commitment to the N bits Ω ξ , ξ = 1, . . . , N. In the SOBAS-Open phase, Bob inputs R ⊆ {1, . . . , N} and Alice unveils the bits Ω ξ with position ξ ∈ R if she wants. The unveiled bits Ω ξ , ξ ∈ R, are tested by Bob. So a SOBASC on Ω ∈ {0, 1} N is almost the samething as N independent bit commitments on Ω ξ , ξ = 1, . . . , N. A SOBASC on N bits is different from N independent bit commitments because the bits to be opened must be opened all at the same time.
In the remainder of this section, we describe a quantum protocol that realises a SOBASC on a string Ω ∈ {0, 1} N using m 2 independent bit commitments x[i, j], i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , m. In the next section, we describe a quantum protocol which allows Alice to generate M > m 2 independent bit commitments on top of a SOBASC on a string Ω ∈ {0, 1} N where N = 2 × M × n. The integer n is a security parameter.
The SOBAS-Commit phase. A subprotocol SOBAS-Commit(Ω ξ ) will be executed for every bit Ω ξ , ξ = 1, . . . , N. Here we describe the subprotocol SOBAS-Commit(Ω ξ ) for a single value of ξ.
Step 1 At the end of SOBAS-Commit(Ω ξ ), Alice has commited herself m times to bit Ω ξ , once for each value of j.
The SOBAS-Open(R) phase.
Step 1. For every ξ ∈ R, Alice announces Ω ξ and the m 2 bits u ξ [i, j].
Step 2. Testing Alice. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, Bob uniformly picks at random a subset X j ⊆ {1, . . . , m}. For every i ∈ X j , Alice opens the commitments to x[i, j]. For every ξ ∈ R, for every j, Bob measures the photons at position i ∈ X j in the bases x[i, j] and notes the outcomes v ξ [i, j] and tests that he has
Summary of the notations used.
x[i, j] The initial m 2 commitments which corresponds to the m 2 bases used by Alice for each bit a(ξ) in the BASC. The same m 2 bases are used for each bit a(ξ). u ξ [i, j] The m 2 bits encoded by Alice to commit m times the bit Ω(ξ), once for each value of j. For every j, we have
The m 2 outcomes obtained by Bob for each bit Ω ξ in the SOBASC.
Proof of the concealing property. Without the bases x[i, j]
for i ∈ X j , Bob has almost no information about ⊕ i ∈Xj u ξ [i, j], and therefore almost no information about Ω ξ for ξ ∈ R.
Remark. If Bob could break the initial commitments to the bases x[i, j] with i ∈ X j , he would be able to measure in these bases and obtain the commited bit Ω ξ . It is important that the concealing property of these commitments cannot be broken by Bob.
Proof Ωξ . Also, if Alice is really committed to x[i, j], it is not hard to see that the probability that Ω ξ =Ω ξ and Ω ξ =⊥ is negligeable.
Remark. As we explained before, for ξ ∈ R, even though Alice will never be requested to unveil Ω ξ , Bob must keep all the photons on his side. In our particular SOBASC protocol, if Bob returns only one (non measured) photon for xi ∈ R, then Ω ξ is not stored outside Alice's location anymore and the purpose of the SOBASC is defeated! It is important that the bitΩ ξ is stored in photons which are not accessible to Alice. Alice can have access toΩ ξ on her side, butΩ ξ should also be accessible outside Alice's location via other qbits. These other qbits doesn't have to be on Bob's side, they can be in the environment or distributed in between Bob and the environment. In our case,Ω ξ is not entirely on Bob's side because the random bases x[i, j] are not all available on Bob's side.
Bit Commitment Expansion
Here we will use the SOBASC primitive as a black box. So, we will not have to refer to the m 2 initial bit commitments anymore. We will show how to create M > m 2 bit commitments to z[1], . . . , z[M] using the SOBASC primitive.
The idea is to do one execution of the one-out-of-two string oblivious distribution protocol proposed by Crépeau [13, 14] for every bit z[t], t = 1, . . . , M, and use the easy reduction of bit commitment to one-out-of-two string oblivious distribution. We recall that in a oneout-of-two string oblivious distribution from Bob to Alice, Bob has two strings w 0 and w 1 . Alice can choose to obtain w 0 or w 1 , but not both. Bob cannot find out which string was chosen by Alice. Alice can commit to 0 by choosing w 0 and she can commit to 1 by choosing w 1 . There will be M independent executions of Crépeau's protocol and each execution will return an independent bit commitment. The independence of these M bit commitments will not be difficult to see despite the fact that these M bit commitments use a single SOBASC which is built by making use of only m 2 < M initial bit commitments.
For every commited bit z[t], t = 1, . . . , M, returned by the expansion Bob will send n photons to Alice. An integer k = 1, . . . , n, distinuishes these n photons. Each of these photons are measured by Alice in a random basis a t [k] and the outcome g t [k] is noted by Alice. To make the connection with section 3, we will also use the notations
and Ω (t,k,1)
. All bases Ω (t,k,0) and outcomes Ω (t,k,1) will have to be committed by Alice using a single SOBASC on Ω. Now we descibe the expansion protocol in more details.
Expand-Commit(z):
Step 1. For each t = 1, . . . , M, Alice picks a string of n bases a t ∈ {+, ×} n and executes SOBAS-Commit(a t [k]) for every t = 1, . . . , M and k = 1, . . . , n. The SOBAS-Commit phase will resume later to commit the outcomes of the M × n measurements.
Step 2. For every t = 1, . . . , M, Bob uniformly picks at random a string of bits h t ∈ {0, 1} n , a string of BB84 bases b t ∈ {+, ×} n , encodes the bits h t [k] using the bases b t [k] and sends the photons to Bob.
Step 3. Alice measures in the bases a t [k], she notes the outcomes g t [k] and executes SOBAS-Commit(g t [k]) for every outcome g t [k].
Step 4. For every t = 1, . . . , M, Bob picks a set R t ⊆ {1, . . . , n} uniformaly at random, he defines R = {(t, k, τ) | k ∈ S t , τ ∈ {0, 1} }, and ask Alice to execute SOBAS-Open(R). Let S t =R t and S = {(t, k, τ) | k ∈ S t , τ ∈ {0, 1} }. For every t, the open positions k ∈ R t are used to test that Alice did measure all the photons at step 3 whereas the non open position k ∈ S t will be used in the remainder of the protocol.
Step 5. Bob announces the bases b t [k] for k ∈ S t and Alice can separate S t in two sets
Summary of the notations used.

z[t]
These are the M > m 2 bits which are committed in the expansion.
. . , M, the n bits a t [k] are the bases used by Alice to measure the n photons sent by Bob. Alice commits herself to these M × n bits using a single SOBASC.
These are the outcomes obtained by Alice. Alice also commits herself to these outcomes using the same SOBASC.
For every fixed t, this protocol is essentially the one-out-of-two string oblivious distribution proposed by Crépeau from Bob to Alice. For every t, the two strings on Bob . Now, we sketch the proof of security for this protocol. The security of our protocol is an immediate consequence of previous work on the security of Crépeau's protocol. The oneout-of-two string oblivious distribution protocol of Crépeau is not secure, but it is insecure only because it uses bit commitment as a subprotocol. Here the primitive SOBASC replaces the required bit commitments. Alice must execute the measurments at step 3 and she cannot undo these measurments because in view of the binding property the choice of bases and the outcomes are accessible outside Alice's location. The independence of the M executions comes from the fact that 1) the bits commited in a SOBASC can be chosen independently and 2) whether or not a bit in a SOBASC is open can be decided independently of whether or not another bit is open in this SOBASC. The bit version of Crépeau's protocol with no error correction was shown secure by Yao [15] under the hypothesis that an unconditionally secure bit commitment (in which Alice remains binded even when the bit is not open) was possible, and the extension to String OT with error correction (i.e. the complete version proposed by Crépeau) was proven secure by Mayers [11] . This concludes the proof of security for our protocol.
Defeating the impossibility result
Here we discuss why the general impossibility result for bit commitment does not apply to the expansion protocol. After the commit phase, if Alice commits bit x, the system is left in a state ρ x , x ∈ {0, 1}. Because the protocol is known, the two states ρ 0 and ρ 1 are known by Alice and Bob. The theorem against bit commitment states that no two pure states ρ 0 and ρ 1 correspond to an information theoretic bit commitment. An information theoretic bit commitment necessarily implies that we have two (non pure) mixed states ρ 0 and ρ 1 . In particular, the general attack would fail if we could force the cheater to throw qbits away in the environment during the commit phase. The theorem would fail because after the commit phase the bipartite system of Alice and Bob might be in a mixed state.
The problem with bit commitment is simply that there is no way to force the cheater to throw away qbits in the environment. This fact is obvious if we consider a protocol entirely executed at the quantum level. The situation is a little bit more complicated if the protocol includes classical announcements because one might argue that in every classical announcement many qbits are trown away irreversibly in the environment. We can easily take care of this issue because protocols which use classical announcements are not more secure than protocols which are entirely executed at the quantum level. Nevertheless, here it is useful to directly consider protocols in which classical announcements are used. In such a case the basic argument against bit commitment is simply that the system collapse to a new pure state after each announcement [2] . At the end, for each value of the bit committed, we still have two pure states which are known by Alice and Bob. See [2] for more details.
The intuition behind the expansion protocol is to start the protocol with a mixed state. The initial state is a mixed state because the bases x[i, j] are random. It is important that the bases x[i, j] are not known by Bob. If the bases x[i, j] were known by Bob, then these bases will be like parameters, and the impossibility result will apply separately to each assigment of bases. We see why some of the m 2 initial bit commitments had to remain closed in our expansion protocol. If they were all open, then the random bases x[i, j] will be shared by Alice and Bob. As in the analysis of classical announcements, for each fixed assignment of bases x[i, j], the corresponding state of the bipartite system for Alice and Bob would be a pure state and the impossibility theorem would apply.
It is also important that there is a correlation between the quantum information that is prepared (and at least partially transmitted) by Alice in the protocol and the bits x[i, j], i ∈ X j , which are not open by Alice. Otherwise, the bits which are not open will factorise, leaving the remainder of the system in a pure state and the impossibility result will apply. Because X j is chosen at random by Bob, Alice must create such a correlation. Therefore, the theorem against bit commitment does not apply to our expansion protocol.
Temporary computational assumptions
It might appear that our expansion protocol could be used to generate information theoretic bit commitments using a temporary computational assumption for the m 2 initial bit commitments. The wrong intuition is the following. If Alice cannot break the temporary computational assumption, then she will have to behave in the commit phase as if the bit commitments were information theoretic. The binding property will be obtained and would hold for ever because Bob keeps the photons on his side. So from this naïve analysis we conclude that Alice's measurements are really executed. In a non standard model of communication, this conclusion might be correct. For example, as we now explain, this conclusion is correct if a commitment can be realised using a safe box which contains the bit on a classical support such as a piece of paper. Safe boxes will force Alice to commit the bases x[i, j] on a classical support (because some of these boxes will be tested). If some of these boxes are not open and returned to the cheater, the sitution is exactly the same as if the cheater generated private classical bits. So Alice will indeed have executed real measurements. We think that a similar argument can be used if we use the decoherence assumption on top of another temporary computational assumption because somehow the decoherence assumption states that the cheater is forced to send qbits in the environment. However, this conclusion is wrong in the standard model. It contradicts the analysis provided in [17] . We want to analyse this issue because unless one understands what is going on, one might have some suspicions about the expansion protocol.
For every (t, k) with k ∈ R t , the binding property for Alice's bit commitment on Ω (t,k,1) = g t [k] is needed to conclude that Alice's measurement at position (t, k) is really executed. This binding condition on g t [k] was proven in the analysis of our SOBASC protocol via a test on m 2 photons. This test was only a mathematical construction because, for k ∈ R t , the position k is not tested. If we want to know the binding condition on g t [k] at a given time T , we must define this binding condition in terms of a test executed at time T . Note also that this test does not only consider the information coded in the photons but also the bases x[i, j]. If Alice is not committed to the basesx[i, j], i ∈ X j , then Alice's situation is exactly the same as if she executed the same attack but was never committed. These temporary commitments are not an obstacle because Alice's strategy is to execute the honest algorithm at the quantum level. Certainly, if the standard model of communication is used, nothing in the honest protocol, including temporary commitments, can prevent Alice from being honest at the quantum level. Therefore, because the initial commitments are out of the way, the general attack against bit commitment applies, and if Bob has no information about Ω ξ = g t [k], then Alice can swap the value of g t [k] and so she can undo her measurement.
In the preceding analysis, we used the general impossibility theorem for bit commitment to obtain that, if Alice is not commited to the bases x[i, j] and Bob has no information about the bits g t [k] for k ∈ R t , Alice can swap the bits g t [k]. However, we don't know if she has an efficient way to swap these bits, and such an analysis is beyond the scope of this document.
We now explain why Kent's relativistic bit commitment protocol [5] cannot be used on a temporary basis to start up the protocol. Kent's protocol can be used if we are willing to run the protocol for ever (i.e., until after we can open all the new commitments). The same problem as in the case of the temporary computational assumptions applies with Kent's protocol. The limitations which are imposed by relativity, as in in the case of computational limitations, are not real limitations for the general attack because the cheater needs only to execute the honest algorithm at the quantum level. Therefore, if a pure state is obtained at the end, the theorem against bit commitment applies. However, a relativistic protocol can be useful to realise bit commitment if the protocol maintains a third system which cannot be controlled by Alice and Bob. This is the basic idea behind the protocol proposed by Kent [5] . Such a third system cannot prevent the cheater to execute the honest algorithm at the quantum level, but the attack in the opening phase will not apply because we have a tripartite system. However, as soon as we are back to a bipartite system the theorem will apply again, so in theory Kent's protocol will have to be maintained for ever. A more direct analysis of these hard to think computational or relativitic limitations is provided in [17] with two examples.
Conclusions
The proposed bit commitment expansion protocol is interesting because it can be useful to restore post cold war applications in quantum cryptography. It will be interesting to see if the protocol or a variation on the protocol can be implemented with the current technology.
In particular, the protocol should work even if Bob does not store the photons and measures them immediatly using random bases.
